Abstract

The article analyses the issue of Yugoslav–Bulgarian unification within the broader idea of a Balkan (con)federation from the aspects of internal and external stakeholders. The author describes the key interwar factors and events impacting the formation of states in postwar South-east Europe and, building on this, identifies the primary motives for/against the idea of a Balkan (con)federation with respect to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. In the second part, the role of this idea during the period of Yugoslav and Bulgarian rapprochement immediately after the war is analysed and the major events determining the dramatic turnaround in the Bulgarian–Yugoslav relationship in 1948, when the idea was abandoned, are presented. It is argued that the Yugoslav side tried to take advantage of the (con)federal idea to manoeuvre between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, which on the other hand were never very keen on a Yugoslav–Bulgarian state. The BCP showed somewhat greater interest, primarily due to the Macedonian issue. Bulgaria had to follow Moscow’s policy almost entirely, hoping this would lead to Soviet support in obtaining anti-fascist ally status and resolving internal problems with the Bulgarian opposition. From this perspective, promoting the (con)federative alliance with Yugoslavia was the Bulgarian communists’ strategy for accomplishing the nationalistic aim of not completely losing Macedonia. Provided Bulgaria would be an equal part of the dual federation, the BCP had no problem even ceding Pirin Macedonia to the unified socialist Republic of Macedonia.

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