The Idea of Nuclear Dominoes in the Gulf Region

Abstract

Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XL, No.4, Summer 2017 The Idea of Nuclear Dominoes in the Gulf Region Nursin Ateşoğlu Guney* Visne Korkmaz* In 2006 fourteen countries from the Middle East and Asia stated their demands for nuclear power plants1 . This demand brought some concern; Western experts have questioned the situation from the standpoint of nuclear non-proliferation and did not hesitate to ask whether or not this could be the beginning of a new nuclear cascade2 . These experts announced that the non-nuclear states of the treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) should adapt strengthened non-proliferation measures so that a new tide of nuclear proliferation could be prevented3 . Since then the Middle East and the world in general have witnessed important events like the 2008 financial crisis, the 2011 Arab Spring and subsequent instability—due to the failing and failed states in the (MENA) Middle East and North Africa region—and the Iranian nuclear 63 *Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney earned her PhD from Istanbul University, she is a professor of international relations in Istanbul, Turkey. She is also vice president and security and nuclear energy fellow at the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM). She contributes to BİLGESAM every month by writing one analysis on security related matters. She has extensively published on Middle East, security studies, American foreign and security policies, EU, NATO and arms control and disarmament issues as well as on energy and migration issues. She is the member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a member of Board of Directors of International Geostrategic Maritime Observatory. *Visne Korkmaz earned herPhD from Marmara University. She is an associate professor of International Relations at Yildiz Technical University in Istanbul. She also gives lectures on IR, International Security and Middle East at Air Force School and Air Force Academy of the Republic of Turkey. Her interest areas cover regional security, security theories, Middle East and Euro-Atlantic security. She has numbers of scholarly articles and books on these issues. 1 Mark Fitzpatrick, “Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran”, IISS Strategic Dossier, May 2008, pp. 1-165. 2 Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney, “Is the Nuclear Cascade Story in the Middle East Real?”, Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Republic, Vol: XVI, No: 2, Summer 2011, pp.43-59. 3 Ibid, p.50. 64 crisis and its resolution with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Agreement (JCPOA) in 2015. After the Fukushima meltdown, the pace of Middle Eastern countries’ attempts to acquire nuclear reactors seemed to slow a little, as it did in other parts of the world. However, the drive of the Middle Eastern countries in acquiring reactors did not fade, and some have made real progress in this regard4 . Since 2006 the main debate and concern aroused in the West was about the increase in the demand for nuclear reactors in the Middle East, mostly associated with the prospect of nuclear proliferation. Until the finalization of the Iranian nuclear deal, the main priority of the West in general—and the US in particular—was curtailing the “right to enrichment”5 . According to Washington’s viewpoint, in order to guarantee nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle East the states of the region needed to forego the right to enrich nuclear material when seeking nuclear energy. In fact, when the section 123 Agreement was signed with the United Arab Emirates UAE it was hoped that this could set an example for other states in the Middle East in their search for civil nuclear energy6 . This US demand has surely contradicted Article 4 of the NPT, which gives non-nuclear states the right to enrichment in their efforts to obtain nuclear energy for civil uses7 . That is why the “the right to enrich” uranium proved to be one of the key sticking points in the Iran nuclear talks, and therefore with this deal Tehran has gained the legitimate right of enrichment at 3.67 percent, on the condition, of course, that it abides with other conditions that were set down in the Joint...