The ICC’s First ‘Forced Pregnancy’ Case in Historical Perspective

Abstract

Abstract Reproductive violence, as distinct from the related issue of sexual violence, is yet to be truly ‘surfaced’ in international criminal law. Yet, this kind of violence has long been a feature of war, and is repugnant to the values that international criminal law protects. The Ongwen case, which commenced trial in the International Criminal Court in December 2016, is a step forward in this regard. Not only is this the first case in any international criminal court to include charges of ‘forced pregnancy’; it is also one of the only cases in which reproductive violence outside the context of genocide or ‘ethnic cleansing’ has been understood as a crime under international law. This article situates this landmark case is its historical contex, and raises some broader concerns about the limited response to reproductive violence in the development and enforcement of international criminal law. Based on an analysis of the law and practice of past and present international criminal courts, it shows that accountability for conflict-related reproductive violence has been patchy at best, and that there has been little recognition of the harms that such violence causes to individual victims, as distinct from the groups to which they ‘belong’. The article concludes by sketching out some steps to remedy these omissions, building on the progress made in the Ongwen case. Underlying the article is a view that reproductive autonomy is a distinct value from sexual autonomy, and that, where possible, conduct which offends this value should be punished as a separate crime.