Abstract
ABSTRACTWhat is it to be a human person? This is the question posed by all human existence, but particularly so by the mentally disabled. Their existence challenges the currently dominant understanding of humanity and personhood. The dependency of the mentally disabled is difficult to reconcile with the liberal conception of man as rational and autonomous. Meanwhile, the standard substantialist account of personhood fails to adequately ground the personal status of the mentally disabled. The author argues that only a theologically grounded relational account of personhood can explain why the mentally disabled are persons deserving of love and respect.
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