The human embryo: biological or personal life?

Abstract

In ethical discussions about the moral status of the human embryo, one regularly comes across the argument that the embryo in its early stages is not yet ‘personal life’. It should be considered as ‘biological life’, with the same moral status as other forms of biological life, such as animals. Only persons have moral standing. The author argues that this distinction resembles cartesian dualism, but with a materialistic, evolutionary account of the development of person-like qualities superimposed upon it. Without this latter addition, cartesian dualism could just as well be used to defend the view that the human soul, as the core of the human personality, is present from the very beginning of embryological development, or even before conception. The problem with the ontological distinction between personal and biological life is that scientists or ethicists using this argument give a specific materialistic ontological interpretation of biological knowledge, which is then used to define morally relevant thresholds in embryological development. Those who make this distinction further assume that biological life only has instrumental value and no intrinsic value. In animal and environmental ethics many arguments have been put forward against the validity of this assumption.