The Hull-Nomura Conversations: A Fundamental Misconception

Abstract

IN the diplomatic talks between Japan and the United States which were begun in the spring of 1941, the government of Prince Fumimaro Konoye chose to be represented by a retired admiral rather than by a career diplomat. Ambassador Kichisabur6 Nomura had met Franklin D. Roosevelt years before, when the former had seen service in Washington and the latter had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy. The admiral, who had other prominent American friends, had also held the foreign portfoliol in the short-lived cabinet of General Nobuyuki Abe (August 30, 1939-January 15, I940), which had been entrusted with the task of trying to improve relations with the United States. Because of these connections, it was thought that Nomura might be able to win understanding for Japan's case. Such experience as he had acquired during his brief tenure at the Foreign Office would stand him in good stead. Knowing that the navy did not want to risk its fleet unnecessarily, some Japanese leaders seem also to have believed that having an admiral in Washington might prevent matters from getting out of hand. Nomura's personal reluctance to accept the proffered ambassadorial post was largely overcome by the persuasive efforts of naval colleagues, who encouraged him with assurances that the imperial navy did not intend to fight the United States.' Although these various reasons may have appeared sound at the time, the posting to Washiington of an ambassador who was far more at home in dealing with naval matters than in handling problems of foreign relations