Abstract
As we have already seen, two propositions in the last chapter have been matters of contention in the theoretical literature as well as in the practical political world. The first is that it is not only individuals who are human rights holders. Jack Donnelly argued that only individuals can be human rights holders and denied the relevance of solidarity to human rights. For him, collectivities such as groups or nations can have certain rights, but never human rights.1 These are reserved for individuals and seem to be undergirded only by the values of liberty and equality. Donnelly challenges non-Western writers—such as Asmarom Legesse and Issa Shivji—who have advanced more collectivist or solidaristic conceptions of human rights.2
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