Abstract

It has sometimes occurred that a specious explanation of a fact, or a specious amendment of an error, has established itself so firmly in the court of history, that no one dreamed of disputing its claim to be unquestionably correct. At last, by accident, a doubt arises in some one's mind; and, after enjoying a long protracted success, the universally received solution, when its antecedents are investigated and its implications realized, turns out to be wholly ‘impossible.’ It may be easily shown, I think, that such is the case with the traditional explanation of the extension of the names Hellas and Hellen to the wide signification which they bore since the seventh century B.C. This explanation has had the inestimable advantage of resting on the authority of Thucydides; and it belongs to that class of explanations which merely require to be stated in order to recommend themselves, and which the human mind is accordingly inclined to accept unreflectingly. It has come to be regarded as a commonplace historical fact; yet it is noteworthy that in some recent histories of Greece it is simply stated that the Greeks adopted Hellenes as a common name, without any suggestion of an answer to the obvious question why that name was chosen rather than another. The authors apparently felt some difficulty in accepting the exposition of Thucydides. E. Meyer seems to have realized the difficulty more fully, and some remarks which he offers on the point will call for notice. In this paper I propose to exhibit the difficulties which render the received view untenable, and to put forward another explanation in its stead.

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