Abstract

If the first chapter comprised an attempt to make conceptual sense of radicalism, this chapter comprises an attempt to historical sense of radicalism. Thus, it is not a history of radicalism, but a philosophical — or, more precisely, a systematic — engagement with the history of radical thought. Even at that, it engages with only a part of that history: the radicalism of a particular epoch (modern) and culture (Western). That is to say, I only engage with modern Western radicalism here, though I don’t dispute the claims that (a) there were pre-modern radicalisms (and there may be post-modern radicalisms), and (b) there have been (and still are) non-Western radicalisms. So, what accounts for these limitations to my engagement with radical history (or the history of radical political philosophy)? There are three factors. First, the entire history of all radicalism would be unmanageable here (indeed, many may doubt the manageability of my more limited project). Second, such an engagement falls within my area of interest, namely, modernity. This is quite apparent in the final two chapters, where I attempt to defend two ideas which are characteristic of much modern radicalism. And, third, such an engagement falls within my area of competence, namely, Western philosophy. I claim no competence in non-Western philosophy, though I am by no means dismissive of it.

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