The History of Psychology and its Retrieval from Historiography

Abstract

Stimulated by the popularity of T. S. Kuhn's monograph The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, a number of writers have concerned themselves with the question of the applicability of Kuhn's account of scientific development for the discipline of psychology. They have attacked or defended allegedly 'Kuhnian ideas' in a multitude of guises, and have offered an alarming profusion of 'refutations' or 'corrections' to 'Kuhn's conception of science'.' Relatively unnoticed, but of crucial importance in attempting to assess the merit of these articles, is the fact that virtually all these writers have a theoretical axe to grind in supporting or attacking (what they perceive to be) Kuhn's views. Equally important, that axe may have either or both a methodological and historiographical, or substantive psychological, character. Both affirmations and denials of Kuhn's views result in large part from the methodology of scientific research that the writer accepts, from the historiography of science that he endorses, and in psychology especially, from the ongoing research programme and conceptual framework in which he works. Another factor of crucial importance is that with few exceptions, these theorists assume that the history of psychology is an unproblematic issue, and