Abstract
The hidden role of processors in an individual transferable quota fishery
Highlights
Fisheries management systems can have many unexpected and often unwelcome impacts, influencing power dynamics, resilience, and overall fisheries success (Foley et al 2015, Hentati-Sundberg et al 2015, Stoll et al 2016)
The analysis indicated that direct processor ownership of halibut quota, while more than doubling between 1996 and 2016, remains relatively low at less than 10% of the available quota
Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) are permits that allow the holder of the ITQ to catch or transfer a share of a total allowable catch (TAC)
Summary
Fisheries management systems can have many unexpected and often unwelcome impacts, influencing power dynamics, resilience, and overall fisheries success (Foley et al 2015, Hentati-Sundberg et al 2015, Stoll et al 2016). The potential for a small number of processors to exert control that distorts fish prices and disadvantages independent fishing enterprises was the impetus for both the fleet separation and owner-operator policies in Atlantic Canada (Gough 2008). Concerns about the negative impact of processor ownership of fisheries access led to the establishment of limits on corporate concentration in the B.C. fisheries (Shaffer 1979, Pinkerton 1987, Gough 2008) and owneroperator and fleet separation provisions in other regions of Canada (Gardner 1995, Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2007, Gough 2008, Foley et al 2015, Barnett et al 2017). We consider the extent of processor control in an era of quota leasing by processors
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