Abstract
Maynard Smith (1978) has raised the problem of the hawk-dove game played between relatives. Here, the evolutionarily stable state of the population is found as a function of the average relatedness of a player to his opponents. Surprisingly, the continuous or ‘mixed’ strategy case and the discrete or ‘pure’ strategy case must be treated separately. It is claimed that previous published analyses of the evolutionarily stable state are invalid. The errors committed are discussed, and ascribed to the use of the concept of ‘fitness’, rather than the less confusing notion of gene frequency.
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