The Hard Question for Hylomorphism

Dana Goswick

doi:10.5334/met.1

Abstract

The view that ordinary objects are composites of form and matter (“hylomorphism”) can be contrasted with the more common view that ordinary objects are composed of only material parts (“matter only”). On a matter-only view the hard question is modal: which modal profile does that (statue-shaped) object have? Does it have the modal profile of a statue, a lump, a mere aggregate? On a hylomorphic view the hard question is ontological: which objects exist? Does a statue (matter-m + statue-form), a lump (matter-m + lump-form), and/or a mere aggregate (matter-m + mere aggregate-form) exist? I defend a novel answer to the hard question for hylomorphism. In particular, I argue that which ordinary objects exist depends, in part, on how subjects respond to the matter they encounter. I argue that, with regard to grounding the existence and modal properties of ordinary objects, response-dependent hylomorphism is superior to both matter only views and to non-response-dependent versions of hylomorphism.

Highlights

A hylomorphic view of ordinary objects has an advantage over matter-only views of ordinary objects, such as e.g. Jubien (2001), Quine (1960), or Sider (2001), when it comes to accounting for the modal properties of ordinary objects
On a matter-only view the hard question is modal: which modal profile does that object have? Does it have the modal profile of a statue, a lump, a mere aggregate? On a hylomorphic view the hard question is ontological: which objects exist? Does a statue, a lump, and/or a mere aggregate exist? Koslicki appeals to science: our best science tells us which kinds of objects exist and philosophy defers (2008, 200–234)
Matter-only view have an easy time grounding the existence of objects which have modal properties and a hard time grounding the object’s having of modal properties

Summary

Introduction

The Aristotelian view that ordinary objects are composites of form and matter (“hylomorphism”) has seen a resurgence of popularity, e.g. Fine (1999, 2003, 2008), Johnston (2002, 2006), and Koslicki (2006, 2008). Prima facie, a hylomorphic view of ordinary objects has an advantage over matter-only views of ordinary objects, such as e.g. Jubien (2001), Quine (1960), or Sider (2001), when it comes to accounting for the modal properties of ordinary objects. By literally building form into what it is to be the object, hylomorphists have a starting point for modality which matter-only adherents do not. For the hylomorphist, accounting for an ordinary object’s modal properties is easy in a way it isn’t for adherents of matter-only views. On a matter-only view the hard question is modal: which modal profile does that (statue-shaped) object have? On a hylomorphic view the hard question is ontological: which objects exist? Fine appeals to a principle of modal plenitude: every form that’s eligible to combine with matter m does so: a statue, a lump, and a mere aggregate all coincide (1999). I argue that which forms combine with which bits of matter — and, which ordinary objects exist — depends on the intrinsic properties and situation of the matter and form, but, on how subjects respond to relevant bits of matter.

The Material Part of Ordinary Objects

The Formal Part of Ordinary Objects

Response-Dependent Hylomorphism

Conclusion