The habitual conception of action and social theory

Abstract

The concept of habit has an established place in the conceptual arsenal of philosophy and social theory. However, it has not been noticed clearly enough, that there are two di¤erent variants of this concept around. The older notion, which might be called the classic ‘Humean’ variant, treats habit as a routine-like behavior pattern where the acting subject's consciousness, rationality, and intentionality are not involved. Its alternative stems from the philosophical tradition of pragmatism, and understands ‘habit’ as open for the acting subject's reflection, during the course of action. Accordingly, as the philosopher Stephen Turner (The Social Theory of Practices: Tradition, Tacit Knowledge, and Presuppositions, Polity Press, 1994) asserts that various theories of action in modern social theory in fact tacitly rest on the notion of habit, he makes a strong case. However, the prospects of social theory are not necessarily as gloomy as he sees them, because it is possible to reinterpret habit in the above, more advanced pragmatist sense. In that case, human reflection can be in charge of habitual behavior patterns, and this gives us a more advanced action-theoretic conceptual tool to be used in social theory.