The Griffith Empathy Measure Does Not Validly Distinguish between Cognitive and Affective Empathy in Children

Abstract

ObjectiveTo evaluate the construct validity of the Griffith Empathy Measure (GEM), specifically the validity of its separate “cognitive” and “affective” empathy scales. If these scales do distinguishably measure these separable constructs, then this would greatly complicate many past findings using the unidimensional Bryant Empathy Index, which is the original source of the scale items. If these scales are not valid as distinguishable measures of cognitive and affective empathy, however, then their growing use in this manner is not justified.MethodIn addition to a narrative theoretical review of the cognitive and affective scales of the GEM, I conducted a small meta‐analysis of the GEM's scales relationships with callous‐unemotional (CU) traits in children. CU traits are widely conceptualised as being associated with severe deficits in affective empathy, alongside minimal deficits in cognitive empathy.ResultsAcross five studies, with a total of 3,496 children participants, CU traits were substantially negatively associated with the GEM cognitive empathy scale (r = −.40), but only weakly negatively associated with GEM affective empathy scores (r = −.12).ConclusionI argue that Dadds et al. erred in trying to derive valid measures of both cognitive and affective empathy from an item pool that was not designed for that kind of dual‐use purpose. More specifically, the GEM “cognitive” scale may primarily measure broader callousness, whereas the affective scale may primarily measure only a narrow range of affective empathy, namely emotional contagion.