The Greek Military Dictatorship: Revisiting a Troubled Past, 1967–1974 by Othon Anastasakis and Katerina Lagos, eds.

Abstract

A succession of political challenges and crises dominated Greece's twentieth-century history. The seven-year military dictatorship in Greece from 1967 to 1974 was marked by, among other negative features, a decisive turn away from the contemporaneous democratic patterns evident in most of Western Europe during the Cold War. This edited volume is the outgrowth of an April 2017 conference of scholars from a variety of disciplines who analyze aspects of the dictatorship and its impact. The contributors provide fresh interpretations based, in many instances, on the opening of formerly classified materials.In the introduction, editors Othon Anastasakis and Katerina Lagos point to, among other points, the exceptionalism of the dictatorship's occurrence during a period of strong economic growth in Greece, quite unlike authoritarian patterns in other world regions and periods. Basic to an understanding of the dictatorship's emergence is an overview of the Greek military's historical involvement in politics, and this is effectively presented by André Gerolymatos for the period from 1909 to 1967. When sharp political divisions surfaced over Greece's entry into World War I and then over the status of the monarchy, the officer corps split into factions. From 1916 to 1936, elements of the armed forces intensified their political involvement within a polarized setting, carrying out six revolts. The establishment of Ioannis Metaxas's fascist-style dictatorship in 1936 assured the royalist composition of the officer corps. Gerolymatos describes the rival resistance and collaborationist organizations that emerged during the Axis occupation (1941–1944) and their fates in the immediate post-liberation period and civil war (1946–1949). The restoration of the monarchy, the Truman Doctrine, and the defeat of the Communists in the civil war led to the consolidation of rightist interests politically and in the armed forces. Within the officer corps, a secret organization known as the Holy Bond of Greek Officers (Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon, IDEA) formed in late 1945 to support the monarchy and defend the country against Communism. An offshoot of IDEA later organized the 1967 coup. Gerolymatos argues that the United States defined the Cold War mission of the Greek military as one of providing security against internal threats (i.e., Communist, leftist), in effect echoing IDEA's own conception of its role. To be sure the army's focus on internal security stemmed in part from its awareness that defense against attack from the Soviet bloc would have been impossible without massive U.S. support.Katerina Lagos next points out the vague ideological dimensions of the purported revolution that blended Cold War military ideology with nationalist ideals. Although the postwar military evolved as a politically homogeneous institution, factions within it had differing views of how to “protect the social order.” Lagos covers how the “Colonels,” a midlevel faction of officers led by Georgios Papadopoulos, conspired to bring about the 21 April 1967 coup, seeking to buttress the conservative political order while also advancing their own corporate interests and political agenda. The junta's ideology, as it surfaced, emphasized anti-Communism and the amalgamation of an ambiguous Greco-Christian civilization.Andreas Kakridis surveys economic policy and concludes that, in seeking to maintain healthy growth rates, the junta, despite revolutionary rhetoric, did not deviate in any significant way from policies adopted in the 1950s and early 1960s. The emphasis on growth and consumerism recorded some benefits but led to inflation and ran into serious problems with the oil crisis of 1973. Foreign investment, another dimension of the Greek economy's situation during these years, is analyzed by Nicholas James Kalogerakos. Seeking international acceptance, the Colonels proclaimed that Greece was open for business. Little, however, was effectively done to make Greece more attractive for U.S. and other foreign investors. Some incentives and policies proved to be counterproductive, with the result that foreign direct investment inflows relative to gross domestic product never surpassed levels reached in the mid-1960s.Othon Anastasakis systematically portrays how the Colonels departed from the status quo in the field of education. They deliberately set out to undo the educational reforms in the years immediately before the coup, “echoing the rigidity and reactionary nature of the military mind” (p. 141). Ultranationalism and anti-Communism colored policies for a “Greece of Christian Hellenes,” the regime's ideological motto. Repression, censorship, indoctrination, and propaganda took their toll on the Greek educational system. Foteini Dimirouli follows with an intriguing study of cultural manipulation. The junta silenced intellectuals, often with violence, and implemented book bans, but, in turn, appropriated texts and imagery from prominent classics to advance their populist agenda. Dimirouli focuses on Constantine Cavafy, one of Greece's most prominent literary figures and not normally linked with the authoritarian right. Some of his poems were reinterpreted and modified to promote the regime's legitimacy and nationalist goals.Charalampos Andreopoulos and Athanasios Grammenos discuss the Greek Orthodox Church, another manipulated institution. Shortly after seizing power, the Colonels replaced the sitting Archbishop Chrysostomos of Athens with Ieronymos, whom they felt could be controlled for their interests. In most respects he was, but he also set out to initiate changes in the hierarchy of the archdiocese that violated canonical law and fomented dissension within its ranks. Projecting the image of devout Christians, the dictators identified the church with their nationalist mission. Church issues assumed a transnational dimension, as Alexander Kitroeff discusses in a chapter on the dictatorship's dealings with Archbishop Iakovos, head of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America. Iakovos had agreed to hold the biennial Clergy-Laity Congress in Athens in July 1968, the first time it took place outside North America. The congress offered the dictatorship public relations opportunities with the most influential and wealthiest of Greece's diaspora communities, but in its aftermath relations with the church actually declined. Greece's military rulers were dismissive of Iakovos's leadership and his offers to mediate with the U.S. government for an improvement in relations.Some scholars have long claimed that the Johnson administration played a role in the Colonels’ coup. James Edward Miller contests this premise, basing his position on recently declassified materials. After the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, the United States pursued security interests in Greece and exerted its influence there based on Cold War priorities. From mid-1965, King Constantine and the rightist parties sought to thwart the rising popularity of George Papandreou's Center Union party and his more leftist son, Andreas. The king, ready to back a “constitutional deviation” by loyal generals, sought a “blank check” from Washington that was not delivered. Independently, the mid-level officers acted on 21 April 1967. Although the United States periodically exerted pressure and called for the restoration of democracy, the junta did not modify its harsh policies. In turn, Cold War and Eastern Mediterranean security issues tempered U.S. pressure, particularly under the Nixon administration. Alexandros Nafpliotis offers related judgments for Europe. Despite widespread public opinion against the Colonels in Britain and Western Europe, economic concerns and particularly Greece's strategic role as an ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the volatile eastern Mediterranean outweighed considerations of exerting strong pressure against Athens. The “business as usual” theme also enters into Mogens Pelt's examination of West Germany's policy toward Greece. The West Germans sought to maintain their extensive economic links with Greece, but sharp public opinion and parliamentary criticism against the Greek dictatorship posed challenges for West German governments. Nonetheless, except for some reductions in weapons deliveries shortly before the dictatorship's downfall, Bonn did little to jeopardize Greece's position in NATO.John Sakkas contributes a tightly developed analysis for the junta's policies on the Cyprus question. The strategically located island, characterized by contentious relations between its Greek majority and Turkish minority since its independence as a nonaligned state in 1960, was led by its strong-willed president, Archbishop Makarios. The elusive goal of Greek nationalists was enosis (union) of the island with Greece, an objective opposed by Turkey and, by the time of the junta, resisted by Makarios and his many followers. U.S. officials, for their part, were concerned about maintaining NATO solidarity between feuding allies. Policy regarding Cyprus and Makarios divided the junta's leadership and veered sharply toward action after Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides overthrew Papadopoulos in the wake of the crushing of the Polytechnic student uprising in November 1973. When the ultranationalists in the junta plotted a coup for the overthrow of Archbishop Makarios and possible enosis on 15 July 1974, events spiraled out of their control. Turkey invaded the island five days later, the Greek dictatorship collapsed, and Greeks enthusiastically welcomed the restoration of civilian government on 23 July. The U.S. government's failure to act during the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus inflamed Greek public opinion against Washington for well over a decade.In the concluding chapter the coeditors succinctly highlight the volume's major contributions and then comment on the short- and longer-term legacies of the authoritarian interlude. Greece left its illiberal period behind and transitioned to a functioning democracy that qualified it for entry into the European Economic Community in 1981. Yet relations with NATO and the United States over the Cyprus imbroglio and Turkey's challenges to Greek sovereignty in the Aegean remained strained.Overall, the Anastasakis-Lagos volume is a welcome addition to existing scholarship on this dark interlude in Greece's history. Although all edited volumes face limits and constraints, a more comprehensive profile of the junta could have been constructed with added attention placed on the regime's attempts to restructure institutions (e.g., elections, plebiscites, constitutions), on the cruelty of the secret police and on the impact of domestic and international resistance organizations.