The greatest issue of all: Berlin, American national security, and the cold war

Abstract

The Berlin problem was a constant test of wills in early Cold War. In a contest where resolve was pre-eminent - or more specifically, international credibility of that resolve - Berlin became in Washington's view the greatest issue of all. The issue occupied a unique place in American foreign policy. It was at once a potent symbol of American determination to resist encroachments of Soviet-led Communism as well as a strategic nightmare. Militarily untenable, and yet vital to American security interests, in Washington's estimation Berlin's defence justified, at least in theory, general nuclear war. American responsibility for a sector of Berlin was result of a nebulous process of postwar planning, much of which was conducted before U.S. troops reached Europe in June 1944. Defying all expectations, U.S. presence in West Berlin continued throughout entire Cold War. During that time, Berlin was both cause and location of some of Cold War's worst moments. Unlike earlier studies of Berlin issue, this dissertation examines broader view of Washington's commitment to Berlin. Drawing extensively from recently declassified primary materials, as well as important secondary sources, it attempts to fill a significant gap in our understanding of American commitment to Berlin. In so doing, it demonstrates that Washington's view of problem was unique. Furthermore, although presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy all faced crises over Berlin, each perceived problem in different ways. In fact, there was an important shift in Washington's perception of Berlin problem from time when Truman drew line in Berlin as part of his administration's policy of containment, to more assertive defence of U.S. credibility under Eisenhower and Kennedy. Also, U.S. officials did not concern themselves with Berlin only in times of crisis. Rather, it was an ongoing dilemma that required constant attention. In this process experiences from several other ostensibly unrelated Cold War issues, such as Korean War and Cuban missile crisis, were incorporated by American administrations into their understanding of U.S. commitment to Berlin. Through examining Washington's perception of Berlin issue during period from 1948 to 1963, this study concludes that until American policymakers began to direct more of their attention towards Vietnam in mid-1960s, Berlin was their foremost concern and was a central element of how United States waged Cold War. In this way, Berlin issue conditioned American policymakers in a manner and to an extent that has been greatly underappreciated.