The Great Questions of Epistemology

Abstract

Abstract Chapter 14 is an epilogue—a sketch of how the author’s theory of rational belief can address the remaining great questions of epistemology. First, this theory can give an account of the significance of inference—including non-deductive inference as well as deductive inference; it can also explain how non-deductive inferences are defeasible—allowing for a version of the distinction between “rebutting” and “undercutting” defeaters. Secondly, the theory can give an account of the significance of beliefs—like perceptual beliefs—that endorse the contents of non-doxastic mental states like sensory experiences and episodic memories. Thirdly, the theory can be developed to explain what is wrong with the most challenging arguments for radical scepticism. Finally, the theory can be developed to give an analysis of knowledge—what has elsewhere been called the “internalist virtue theory of knowledge”.