The Great Debate: Competing Grand Strategies for America

Abstract

Abstract : It is now a truism that we have no consensus on grand strategy. There is a lively debate, but no apparent favorites, either among foreign policy elites or general public-though everyone, it seems, could do a better job than the Clinton administration. Judging from tone of the discussion, much is riding on specific choices that must be made soon. There are great lamentations that the U.S. is adrift, strategyless, playing catch-up with each crisis as it comes along. For some, the U.S. is likely to fall victim to an arrogance of power. For others, the U.S. is excessively conciliatory towards other states. Some observers foresee America's preeminence itself prompting, in accordance with inescapable laws of nature, the appearance of an antithesis-either a new great power or a hostile alliance. Many warn of overextension, imperial or otherwise, and consequent exhaustion, gradual or otherwise. This debate has been going on for most of 1990s and shows every sign of continuing well into the new decade, at least. Another aspect of lack of a grand strategy consensus is particularly evident to those of us working in the Department of Defense. Despite nominal coherence between the National Military Strategy and the Clinton administration's National Security Strategy, the military establishment and the administration do not seem to share the same vision. The primary indicators of this divide are recurring frictions over what constitutes a vital interest and over what justifies the use of military force.