Abstract

Abstract The ‘Grammar of thought’ addresses the problem of deductive inference from the standpoint of a cognitive process as well as from the standpoint of a formal model. I argue that the former consideration requires us to think of the form of propositions in close correspondence with the grammar of natural language. Thus, logical form must be the form of sentences of natural language and not the form of sentences of an artificial language. Modern logic has great inference power but fails as a model of actual inference. On the other hand, the older traditional logic, which was weak in inference power, did attempt to adhere to the constraints of natural grammar. The paper sketches a theory of logical structure designed to satisfy the two requirements of conformity to natural syntax and of inference power.

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