The government's subsidy strategy of carbon-sink fishery based on evolutionary game

Abstract

It is necessary to give ecological compensation to promote carbon-sink fishery better serve the carbon neutrality goal. This paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of fishermen, consumers and the government, analyzes the influence of each subject's behavior probability on the strategies of other subjects and the stability of the system. Then we simulate the effects of government subsidy on the evolutionary outcomes based on field survey data. The results are as follows. (1) Government subsidies can produce a dual incentive effect from the production side and the consumption side. The probability of government subsidies positively affects both fishermen's carbon-sink fisheries farming behavior and consumers' decision to purchase carbon-sink fishery products. (2) Under certain conditions, the game system can achieve a steady state, in this case, Fishermen will spontaneously engage in farming marine carbon-sink fishery, consumers will spontaneously purchase carbon-sink fishery products, and the government provides subsidies to fishermen and consumers. (3) The amount of government subsidies has a negative impact on the stability of the evolutionary game system, the government subsidies for fishermen has a positive impact on the stability of the evolutionary game system, and the government subsidies for consumers has a negative impact on the stability of the evolutionary game system.