The Governance of International Courts and Tribunals: Organizing and Guaranteeing Independence and Accountability - A Appeal for Research

I want to make three points in connection with David's lecture, looking at his subject from my own perspective, i.e., that of a judge in an international criminal tribunal. First, I want to consider the specific function of international criminal courts and tribunals as finders. Secondly, I will examine how international criminal courts fit into David's theoretical picture of top-down versus bottom-up judicial bodies. Thirdly, I wish to convey some of my concerns arising from the multiplication of proceedings (criminal and civil) arising from the same facts before different international courts and tribunals. International Criminal Courts as Truth Finders A new feature of the international legal order in the past few decades has undoubtedly been the reemergence of international criminal courts, with the ad hoc criminal tribunals of the United Nations (the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)), the regional mixed international tribunals (Sierra Leone, Cambodia, East Timor), and the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). The driving impulses behind the creation of these institutions may, as David mentioned in his lecture, differ from those behind the classical international courts and tribunals. One of the functions of international criminal law courts is that of providing a historical account and achieving reconciliation of post-conflict societies that have gone through a painful episode of mass atrocities. This is something which they share with another newcomer in the international legal order, and reconciliation commissions (TRCs), which in part originate from the same generating impulses. The latter may even be complementary to international criminal adjudication, as Tom suggested in his Holocaust memorial lecture, wondering whether the post-World War II criminal proceedings in Nuremberg should not have been complemented by a commission that could have examined the greater patterns of the historical behind the holocaust. (1) According to some, international criminal courts have, as far as finding process is concerned, little to add to the truth as it is revealed by journalists or historians, who base themselves on largely the same sources. I beg to disagree with that view. The finding process before criminal courts is of a different qualitative nature, because it is obtained through the specific rules of evidence that apply in criminal proceedings, above all the presumption of innocence and the prosecutorial burden of proof. What has been established by a criminal court following a correct procedure can therefore be said to be more credible in terms of its truthfulness than the produced by journalism or history writing. For example, for those who would wish to deny the Srebrenica massacre, it may have been easier to do so when only journalistic and historical accounts of the 1995 event were available than it is today after the judgments of the ICTY in which two panels of judges (first the Trial Chamber and thereafter the Appeals Chamber) found the facts to be established. This function of finding, and the contribution to history writing that results from this, may be one of the core missions for international criminal courts. In post conflict societies, different versions of the traumatic events often compete with each other. (2) It is extremely difficult for national courts in a post conflict society to make an unbiased assessment of these different versions, especially shortly after the events. This assessment is, however, a crucial factor in the process of transition. Without it, post conflict societies will have little more than annals of these traumatic events, produced by journalists and historians. (3) Through the process of judicial fact finding, international criminal courts help to sort out competing accounts of traumatic events in a conflict situation and to determine the account that will count as the official history that society. …

The sharp increase in international courts and tribunals in recent decades, such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the WTO dispute settlement system, and the International Criminal Court (ICC), means that the international order is, progressively, subject to the rule of law. There are regional human rights courts in Europe, in the Inter-American system and in Africa, but not yet in Asia. At the global level there are a number of global treaty bodies, such as the Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the Committee Against Torture (CAT). This chapter discusses the functions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), then the global human rights treaty bodies and courts, and finally the role of national courts. It also examines to what extent the national, regional and global level act together as a comprehensive judiciary, even as a constitutionalized judicial architecture. Keywords: Committee Against Torture (CAT); constitutionalized judicial architecture; European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR); global treaty bodies; Human Rights Committee (HRC); Inter-American system; international courts; International Criminal Court (ICC); ITLOS; WTO dispute settlement system

The notion of control plays an important role within the context of the law on international responsibility in terms of both ascertaining jurisdiction and attribution of responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, including for mass atrocity crimes committed in armed conflict situations. This chapter aims at analysing the use and the shaping of this notion through several landmark decisions issued by selected key international and regional courts. The international courts include the International Court of Justice, the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals, namely the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court. From the three regional human rights courts, focus remains on the European Court of Human Rights. The aim is to find out how and to what extent this case law has shaped the notion of control in the law on international responsibility for States and individuals in the context of an armed conflict. Ultimately, this analysis will provide more clarity concerning standards of conduct and related legal obligations incumbent upon those involved in an armed conflict, especially civilian and military leaders, non-State armed groups, and State organs involved in planning and executing military operations.

Regional human rights courts like the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), and the African Court of Human and People's Rights (ACtHPR) have become popular sites of mobilization for victims and activists who seek justice when justice fails at home. Besides being platforms for individual remedy, human rights courts increasingly shape social norms and state policy within countries, making them attractive avenues for rights advocates to develop new norms or to push domestic authorities to reform legislation. The judges of these courts can decide, for example, whether same-sex couples have a right to be married, if prisoners have the right to vote or receive HIV/AIDS treatment, or when a state can deport illegal immigrants to a country where they will likely be tortured. As these courts pass their judgments, they often find themselves in conflict with states that are violating human rights of marginalized groups on a large scale and are unwilling to implement international rulings. Although international human rights courts have become increasingly popular venues among victims and activists who seek justice when justice fails at home, we are only beginning to understand how activists play roles in shaping the development of regional human rights courts' case law—the body of judgments that shapes how judges will make their decisions in the future. We now have plenty of international relations and international legal research on the interactions between states and international courts: how judges in these courts wrestle between deferring to the interests of member state governments whose actions are on trial and sticking closely to the conventions' fundamental yet evolving principles (Alter et al., 2019; Helfer & Voeten, 2014). As some states begin to resist international courts' authority, scholars have begun to examine the dynamics of this backlash (Hillebrecht, 2022; Madsen et al., 2018; Sandholtz et al., 2018). Recent studies have also demonstrated that human rights advocates—whether NGOs or individual lawyers—have a significant impact on shaping the jurisprudence of international courts and the impact judgments have in concrete locations (Kahraman, 2018; Sundstrom, 2014; van der Vet, 2012; Kurban, 2020; Conant, 2018; Harms, 2021; Cichowski, 2016; Hodson, 2011; Haddad, 2018). Meanwhile, these advocates themselves have been subject to repression and stigmatization by governments as part of the backlash phenomenon. Without an adequate understanding of the factors shaping activists' engagement with international courts, we risk undervaluing their strategic impact on the expansion of case law, the human rights protection of marginalized groups who cannot find remedies at home, and the domestic implementation of these judgments in an age of state backlash. In this section, we summarize the three papers contained in this symposium and their original contributions to these themes. Over the last decade, dozens of countries have erected legal barriers or started vilifying campaigns to stymie the work of NGOs (Buyse, 2018; Chaudhry, 2022). One tactic in this toolkit is the enactment of burdensome regulation on NGOs that receive funds from foreign donors as they allegedly promote foreign agendas (Christensen & Weinstein, 2013; Dupuy et al., 2021). States that frequently abuse human rights are especially prone to target NGOs that engage in strategic litigation (Hillebrecht, 2019). Most NGOs depend on foreign funding, and NGOs that litigate international cases fall disproportionately in this category, but do funders affect the selection of cases? In “Foreign Agents or Agents of Justice? Private Foundations, NGO Backlash, and International Human Rights Litigation,” Heidi Haddad and Lisa Sundstrom examine the extent to which Western donors, particularly private foundations, have encouraged NGOs in Europe to litigate at the ECtHR as a human rights advocacy strategy. They examine overall patterns of donor funding and NGO litigation records, and look in more detail at the case of Russian NGOs' foreign funding and litigation records. The analysis is extremely timely, as the Russian government's criminalization of independent civil society actors, especially in the human rights field, and their accusation that foreign funding turns NGOs into “foreign agents” have been crucial elements of the Russian regime's autocratization. This claim has also provided fuel for Russia's disenchantment with the ECtHR in recent years, contributing to the assessment of many observers that Russia's full-scale attack on Ukraine was the last straw in an inevitable collision course leading to its exit from the Council of Europe. Haddad and Sundstrom debunk the idea that foreign donors are pushing NGOs toward strategies of human rights litigation. Instead, they argue, there is more evidence that NGOs themselves promoted the mechanism of international litigation as a strategy that donors later adopted. This article is a poignant reminder of the advocacy tools that Russian human rights activists and citizens have lost as a result of their government's departure from the Council of Europe, including ECtHR jurisdiction. Yet it also provides insight into the likely roles of foreign donors in other country cases where NGOs are using international court litigation as a human rights advocacy strategy, which is often a target of the ire of national governments, as explored in the next article in the symposium. When states attack human rights NGOs within their borders and/or international human rights courts themselves, how does this affect the willingness of those NGOs to take cases to international courts, and the ways in which they do so? De Silva and Plagis ask this question in their article about state backlash against NGOs in the case of Tanzania and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. A fascinating empirical question they pose is: does state backlash against NGOs increase NGO litigation at international courts (to contest state repression at those courts and use international mechanisms when domestic ones are not available), roughly in line with Keck and Sikkink's famous “boomerang pattern” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), or decrease it due to heightened fear and restricted NGO capabilities that state repression creates? Employing a process-tracing analysis of NGOs' involvement in three cases before the African Court at different stages of the Tanzanian government's backlash against the Court, De Silva and Plagis find that “two-level backlash” by states can result in both phenomena, either promoting or deterring NGO legal mobilization at international human rights courts, depending on certain conditions. The three selected cases concerning the death penalty, the rights of persons with albinism, and the rights of pregnant schoolgirls and mothers, which took place at different time periods, demonstrate a number of patterns of state backlash interacting with NGO strategies. The authors find that domestic-level state backlash deterred domestic NGOs from partnering with international NGOs in litigation, but that such backlash, when it repressed domestic political and legal mobilization opportunities, actually encouraged both Tanzanian and international NGOs to turn to the African Court more frequently to seek remedies. International-level backlash in turn only deterred NGOs from international litigation when such backlash consisted of state efforts to restrict NGOs' ability to engage in litigation, and not when the international backlash was in the form of routine noncompliance with African Court rulings. Importantly, the authors find that NGO responses to state backlash were significantly shaped by their degree of legal consciousness and expertise with the rules, proceedings, and workings of the African Court. Those NGOs with less knowledge and experience were more likely to back away from engaging with the Court under the pressure of state backlash. De Silva and Plagis conclude that “NGOs' persistent human rights advocacy in the face of state backlash is a double-edged sword,” in the sense that they may not be deterred by state backlash initially, but there is a danger that their continued determination to engage in international litigation could prompt governments to engage in even more severe forms of backlash, with critical impacts on international courts and already vulnerable human rights defenders. Rights advocates have a growing menu of institutions and courts available to them. How do activists choose at which institution to lodge their cases in a world where legal remedies have diversified, or as some have argued, fragmented (Koskenniemi & Leino, 2002)? In “What Makes an International Institution Work for Labor Activists? Shaping International Law through Strategic Litigation,” Filiz Kahraman goes beyond the tendency of legal mobilization studies to only examine how activists interact with a single court or institution. Instead, Kahraman opens up how rights advocates imagine which institution is most receptive to their claims. Drawing on a comparative interview study of British and Turkish trade union activists and their legal mobilization campaigns at international courts and quasi-judicial institutions like the International Labor Organization (ILO), Kahraman examines how activists first probe and then strategically identify which court or international institution is most susceptible to their primary goals of influencing structural reforms and setting new norms. Through this probing process—or dynamic signaling game between courts and litigants—activists push a court's jurisprudence and case law into new issue areas. For instance, at the ECtHR, Turkish trade unionists challenged domestic courts' ruling that public sector workers did not have the right to establish unions, even though the ECtHR had no established case law on labor rights in 1990s. They won the case, with the ECtHR finding that Turkey violated the right of public sector workers to unionize. These cases not only had an impact within Turkey, but over the next decades, similar cases brought by British unionists would spin off the early precedent set by the Turkish legal mobilization efforts. Kahraman argues that they ultimately pushed the ECtHR to recognize the basic trade union rights as fundamental human rights. Kahraman sheds light on the often hidden strategies behind international litigation. Activists litigate not just for the immediate impact on the current case they work on, but how they envision that all the cases they work on may shape norms and domestic structural reforms further in the future. Whether an institution is perceptive of claims lies in the eye of the beholder. Kahraman finds that besides targeting institutions with high compliance rates, they also take cases to institutions with low rates of compliance, especially “if these institutions have extensive judicial authority to create new international norms.” So, it is not the de jure protection set by an international courts, but rather how activists perceive the juridical responsiveness and judicial authority of courts—or, how judges adopt either an activist approach or restraint in response to incoming cases and how willing states are to implement cases of a court, respectively—that determines why activists select certain courts or quasi-judicial institutions (like the ILO). Kahraman gives us new tools to interpret how activists perceive authority and receptiveness and respond to opportunities. Rather than static external legal remedies, courts and quasi-judicial institutions are opportunity structures that are malleable to the strategic vision of the activist or litigant. The articles in this symposium together reveal a number of key overlapping insights. At the broadest level, they demonstrate that activists' behaviors and strategies influence international courts' jurisprudence, politics within states, and the human rights outcomes of everyday citizens—and these influences have often been hidden in our existing canon of research on international courts. In addition, all of these articles show that, while activists may face challenges in their efforts, often including significant backlash from their home state governments, they also continue to retain significant agency through their creative efforts to develop legal strategies and circumvent state repression. Activists perennially innovate: sparking the ideas that inspire donors who fund them; calculating how to continue their litigation work when government actors threaten them; and taking risks in litigation to push courts to expand how they define human rights. However, along with these uplifting conclusions, there are worrying patterns that demand future research. States are increasingly pushing back against the powers of international courts to bind them to costly measures, and as this symposium has shown, national governments often point to activists as contributors to this “problem” of invasive international human rights standards. A growing body of research has tracked how human rights defenders of all kinds globally are under threat from actors like governments and corporations who disagree with their contentious actions. We need more studies that gather comprehensive data and systematically track these threats, specifically with regard to activists who engage in international human rights litigation. We suspect that such activists are likely disproportionately targeted due to the international visibility of their complaints. We also desperately need research into possible innovative responses to these threats to activists—responses from activists, funders, governments of countries that support human rights, and international courts themselves. Freek van der Vet is a University Researcher at the Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki and the principal investigator of the Toxic Crimes Project. Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom is Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. She is the director of the ActinCourts network at UBC and conducts research on legal mobilization by Russian activists.

INTRODUCTION. The practice of modern international criminal courts and tribunals raises serious questions about the proper enforcement of the rights of the accused. Among these rights, the accused's right to compensation is highlighted. Compensation is given to the accused (regardless of the verdict) for violation of his procedural rights and fundamental human rights and compensation to the acquitted person.MATERIALS AND METHODS. The analysis of ensuring the human right to compensation in the event of an unjust sentence is carried out on the basis of international human rights treaties, treaties on the creation of international courts, including appeal to the travaux preparatoires of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the practice of international criminal courts and tribunals, especially the ICC, as well as the International Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The study was conducted using general scientific methods of cognition (in particular, analysis and synthesis), as well as comparative legal, historical legal and formal dogmatic methods. To achieve the corresponding conclusions, various methods of interpretation of the rule of law are used, in particular, grammatical, systematic, teleological, harmonic, etc.RESEARCH RESULTS. In the activities of international criminal courts and tribunals, a violation of the accused’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time is systemic, including due to the absence of any procedural deadlines on the one hand, and the absence of any rules (or their non-application) to restore the rights of the accused and punishment of the party who committed the violation of these rights. This situation poses serious problems of ensuring the rights of specific accused (including justified), but also the development of modern international criminal procedural law and international human rights law.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. National legislation and international human rights instruments provide for the right of an acquitted person to compensation. In international criminal courts, this issue, however, is addressed in different ways. The statutes of international criminal courts ad hoc created by the UN Security Council do not mention the right to compensation for an accused or acquitted person. At the same time, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda recognized that the absence of a reference to law in the Statute of the Tribunal does not mean that the persons concerned do not have the corresponding right. At the same time, this recognition did not have practical consequences. The Statute of the International Criminal Court recognizes the right to compensation, however, does so to a limited extent. Thus, in international criminal courts and tribunals, the provision of the human right to compensation (primarily compensation to an acquitted person) is performed at a lower level than that established in international human rights treaties.

Many new international courts and tribunals have been created since the 1990s. Their role and practice has been analyzed in many books and articles. Significantly less research has been done into the role and practice of the governance institutions of these international courts and tribunals (international judicial governance institutions, or INJUGOVINS). Their functioning is of fundamental importance for these courts and tribunals. This contribution discusses the role of the INJUGOVIN of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS): the Meeting of States Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention (‘SPLOS’). It is SPLOS that carries out the main governance functions for ITLOS. In particular, SPLOS elects the judges of ITLOS and adopts its budget. While the relationship between international courts or tribunals and their INJUGOVINS is often troublesome, this is generally different for the relationship between ITLOS and SPLOS. Since its beginning in 1994 SPLOS has developed from hardly anything, the very thin basis contained in UNCLOS, into a generally well-functioning governance institution (if compared to other INJUGOVINS). Meeting a few days each year and having established its own practice with the support of the UN Secretariat, it has taken the governance decisions that have enabled ITLOS to play its important role in the interpretation and application of UNCLOS, in the development of the law of the sea, and in settling disputes peacefully.

International law generally applies to legal relations and disputes among states. This chapter addresses the issue concerning disputes arising out of domestic civil actions with regard to three international bodies: the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). It discusses recent cases and explores procedural mechanisms and the courts' investigative powers which may be used to permit the affected individual to present his/her own views on the case to the tribunal. The chapter presents two of the cases currently pending before the International Court of Justice concern the constellation presented: Jurisdictional Immunities of the State and Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters . The developments in the practice of the ECHR demonstrate a possible way forward for other international tribunals like the ICJ and the ITLOS. Keywords:European Court of Human Rights (ECHR); International Court of Justice (ICJ); International law; ITLOS

Esmé Shirlow presented the findings of a policy paper developed in collaboration with the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), titled Approaches of International Courts and Tribunals to the Award of Compensation in International Private Property Cases and Implications for the Reform of Investor-State Arbitration. The policy paper follows previous IISD work on compensation in investor-state arbitration, which left open the question of whether approaches to issues of compensation in investor-state arbitration differ from the approaches of other international courts and tribunals (hereinafter, courts), and the extent to which this comparative practice might offer inspiration or ideas for ongoing investor-state dispute settlement reform. The research presented by Dr. Shirlow seeks to answer this question by analyzing how issues of compensation have been analyzed in cases concerning alleged state interferences with private property filed before the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea Annex VII Tribunals, European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR).

The European Union is increasing its participation in dispute settlement systems in the new framework of proliferation of international courts and tribunals. Specifically, the rules of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLO) on jurisdictional settlement of disputes provided in section 2 of Part XV contains express provisions dealing with the participation of EU which are of interest to the study of the issue. Furthermore, there has been decisive progress of the EU and the Member State�s practice before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Recently, the advisory proceeding initiated by the Sub-regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), before ITLOS (case num. 21) highlighted the internal difficulties involved in the appropriate coordination of the EU and the Member State's participation in proceedings before international tribunals. Additionally, the European Court of Justice has clarified a number of issues concerning the definition of EU position and its representation before international courts and tribunals.

The 2022 edition of the Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence ,Yearbook) both updates readers on the important work of long-standing international tribunals and introduces readers to more novel topics in international law. The Yearbook continues to provide expert coverage of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) and diverse tribunals from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), to criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (MICT), to economically based tribunals such as ICSID and the WTO Dispute Resolution panel, to courts of human rights (ECtHR, IACtHR, ACtHPR). This edition also contains original research articles on the developments in the War in Ukraine and the consequences of the proliferation of disinformation, as well as international efforts to protect the cultural heritage of vulnerable populations. Scholars also explore the evidentiary value of reports drafted by NGOs and developments in reparations modalities, among other topics. The Yearbook provides students, scholars, and practitioners alike a valuable combination of expert discussion and direct quotes from the court opinions to which that discussion relates, as well as an annual overview of the process of cross-fertilization between international courts and tribunals.

The Inflated Invocation of Inherent Jurisdiction and Powers by International and Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Between Gap Filling and the Erosion of Core Values

The Nuremberg tribunal was the expression and the beginning of states' recognition of their duty to prosecute genocide and other gross human rights violations. It was a first step towards fulfillin...

NGOs and Human Rights Courts and Compliance Bodies.- International Courts and Compliance Bodies: The Experience of Amnesty International.- The Experience of the AIRE Centre in Litigating before the European Court of Human Rights.- NGOs and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.- NGOs before the European Court of Human Rights: Beyond Amicus Curiae Participation?.- The Role of NGOs before the United Nations Human Rights Committee.- Some Concluding Remarks on NGOs and the European Court of Human Rights.- NGOs and International Criminal Courts and Tribunals.- The Experience of No Peace Without Justice.- NGOs and the Activities of the Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.- NGOs and the Activities of the International Criminal Court.- NGOs and the East Timor Special Panels for Serious Crimes.- Some Concluding Remarks on the Role of NGOs in the ICC.- NGOs and International Environmental Disputes and Compliance Mechanisms.- The Experience of Greenpeace International.- NGOs and the Aarhus Convention.- The World Bank Inspection Panel: About Public Participation and Dispute Settlement.- NGOs in Non-Compliance Mechanisms under Multilateral Environmental Agreements: From Tolerance to Recognition?.- NGOs and Inter-State and European Disputes.- Non-Governmental Organizations and the International Court of Justice.- NGOs and Law of the Sea Disputes.- CIEL's Experience in WTO Dispute Settlement: Challenges and Complexities from a Practical Point of View.- NGOs and the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism.- The Accessibility of European Integration Courts from an NGO Perspective.- Concluding Remarks.- The Amicus Curiae in International Courts: Towards Common Procedural Approaches?.

Are international courts effective tools for international governance? Do they fulfil the expectations that led to their creation and empowerment? Why do some courts appear to be more effective than others, and do so such appearances reflect reality? Could their results have been produced by other mechanisms? This book evaluates the effectiveness of international courts and tribunals by comparing their stated goals to the actual outcomes they achieve. Using a theoretical model borrowed from social science, the book assesses their effectiveness by analysing key empirical data. Its first part is dedicated to theory and methodology, laying out the effectiveness model, explaining its different components, its promise and limits, and discussing the measurement challenges it faces. The second part analyses the role that indicators such as jurisdiction, judicial independence, legitimacy, and compliance play in achieving effectiveness. Part three applies the effectiveness model to the International Court of Justice, the WTO dispute settlement mechanisms (panels and Appellate Body), the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, the European Court of Human Rights, and the European Court of Justice, reflecting the diversity of the field of international adjudication.

Outreach activities of international criminal tribunals remain as a neglected area in the field of international criminal law. This article draws attention to this very under-researched area and highlights the importance of outreach work in providing international criminal justice. By focusing on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (the ICTY) as a case study, the article argues that outreach activities are significant for international criminal tribunals to gain the support of the local populations under their jurisdictions. For the purpose of the article, the ICTY’s main outreach activities are overviewed by using the online data provided in the ICTY’s official website. A detailed analysis of these activities through an engagement with the existing literature shows that delays in the outreach activities, lack of other transitional justice mechanisms, and plea bargaining became the main challenges for the ICTY’s outreach work. These conclusions are significant not only for an evaluation of the tribunal’s legacy in the region of former Yugoslavia but also for deriving “lessons learned” for the other international criminal tribunals and the permanent court International Criminal Court (ICC). International tribunals and courts must learn from the ICTY’s failures and should be vigilant from their establishment till their closure to enhance the public awareness about their work and to gain the support of the local communities under their jurisdictions.