Abstract

Part II of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (‘emergency powers’) has remained almost a dead-letter and has never been fully implemented. The first part of this paper will reflect upon the contents and performance of Part II. The second part will seek to explain the powerful official aversion to it. The reasons for this aversion relate not only to the political implications arising from the implied admission of a loss of control or failure of resilience but also to a disinclination to comply with the mechanisms for limitation and accountability in Part II. The latter point is evidenced by the production of draft Bills which set a lower threshold for use whenever a suitable type of emergency arises. Two such Bills have appeared: the Draft Detention of Terrorist Suspects (Temporary Extension) Bill 2011 and the draft Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigations Measures Bill 2011. This growing trend will be analysed and criticised with respect to the potentially diminished governance of resilience and emergency measures.

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