Abstract
Companies that conduct internal research cannot fully specify the output from that research in advance. Inevitably, spillovers may result. A company might choose to create a technology spin-off company to realize value from such research spillovers. But how is such a spin-off to be governed? Effective spin-off governance structures in a highly uncertain environment must promote experimentation and adaptation, in order to unlock the latent value in a technology. These can conflict with structures intended to manage coordination with the parent firm's complementary assets. This paper analyses 35 spin-off organizations that arose from the Xerox Corporation. Xerox's own initial equity position is negatively correlated with the subsequent performance of its spin-offs, but this is due not to their equity per se, but to Xerox's practices in managing its spin-offs. Spin-offs with a higher percentage of venture capital investors on their Boards were associated with higher financial performance, while spin-offs with a Xerox insider as CEO were associated with lower financial performance. Qualitative interview data suggest that Xerox's practices caused its spin-offs to search locally near Xerox's own business, while spin-offs governed by outside investors' practices searched a broader space for commercializing their technologies.
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