Abstract

Assumptions that major reform in the Soviet economy cannot be realized are challenged. Beliefs that Gorbachev is unable or unwilling to take necessary political risks, that bureaucratic resistance will forestall efforts at incremental change, and that Communist ideology lacks themes that can be used to mobilize support for innovation are analyzed. Assessment of reform should be based on an awareness of the advantages (as well as risks) of a strategy tying Gorbachev's political fate to reform and of the effectiveness of a timetable that consolidates gains in services and agriculture before confronting an entrenched industrial bureaucracy. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: 052, 113, 124.

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