The Good of Life

Abstract

Abstract This chapter considers the implications of Non-Identity Theodicy for divine morality. This requires assessing the extent to which the moral status of a harm inducing action can be affected by the fact that the persons harmed by the action in question would not have existed had that action not been performed. It is argued (against some influential assumptions in the ethics of procreation literature) that the good of a worthwhile human life (lived by someone who otherwise would not have existed) has unique justificatory power, and further that the good of a God-given human life (lived by someone who otherwise would not have existed) has justificatory power great enough to depict God as not violating moral obligations to human persons by his policy of evil allowance. These arguments are aided by an analogy between divine creation and human procreation. Reflection on the morality of human procreation implies, it is suggested, that it is not always wrong to create people in an environment in which you know they will suffer seriously. Further, it is argued that if you think voluntary human procreation is in general morally permissible, you have even more reason to think that divine creation and sustenance is morally permissible; conversely, if you think it would be immoral for God to create and sustain our universe, then you have even more reason to think voluntary human procreation is in general immoral. It is concluded that Non-Identity Theodicy reasonably can be taken to be successful.