Abstract

XXTHEN the machine guns opened fire at Lukouch'iao China had no united army or unified command. The Red Army (Eighth Route Army), the only one which in the course of the war has consistently gained and held new territory and inflicted more casualties than it has suffered, had already made peace with the Central Government and volunteered for war against Japan, but was not yet coordinated with the central command. The Kuangsi forces of Pai Chung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen, also of high quality, had also made peace with Nanking not long before. Nanking's own armies, especially the German-trained divisions, were well equipped and prepared, but most troops in the South, North, Northeast and West, though nominally under central command, were in practice more or less independent.1 This was inevitable, because China had to continue and complete political unification during the war.2 The new unity implies much more than the mechanical linking together of all the old armies under one high command. Nor do better technical equipment, better artillery and much more efficient aviation, important though they are, represent the main achievement in nearly two years of fighting. Organic changes have been going on. The old mercenary soldier has given way to conscripts and volunteers who are fighting for ideas which they know and understand. For a time the Government and its high command were still reluctant to mobilize the whole people, in unison with the army;3 but now the Govern-

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