The Good-Directedness of Τέχνη and the Status of Rhetoric in the Platonic Dialogues

Abstract

AbstractDoes a τέχνη, qua τέχνη, need to be good-directed? On the basis of theGorgias, many scholars have thought the answer is yes; I argue here to the contrary. There are, of course, many beneficial τέχναι, such as medicine and weaving; and there are even unconditionally good τέχναι, like the πολιτικὴ τέχνη; but Plato also happily construes piracy as a τέχνη in theSophist, and, more normally, all sorts of neutral practices as τέχναι (e.g., drama). In order to make this argument, I provide a taxonomy of the different kinds of τέχναι and demonstrate that, across the corpus, there does not seem to be a good-directedness requirement. I then address the evidence of theGorgias, where most commentators find a connection between τέχνη and good-directedness. I argue that this interpretation is incorrect, and that rhetoric in fact fails to be a τέχνη in theGorgiassolely because it is unable to give a rational account. A close reading of theGorgiasshows that this is a plausible interpretation, and comparison with thePhaedrusreinforces the point: in both dialogues, whether rhetoric will be a τέχνη or not hinges only on the question of rationality, not a good-directedness condition.