The good and the powers

Abstract

AbstractNeo‐Aristotelian views of goodness hold that the goodness of something is strictly connected with its goal(s). In this article, I shall present a power‐based, Neo‐Aristotelian view of goodness. I shall claim that there are certain powers (i.e., Goodness‐Conferring Powers, or GC‐powers in short) that confer goodness upon their bearers and upon the resulting actions. And I shall suggest that GC‐powers are strongly teleological tendencies. In Section 1, I shall present the kernel of Neo‐Aristotelian conceptions of goodness. In Section 2, I shall introduce strongly teleological powers and tendencies. In Section 3, GC‐powers will be characterized. I shall also examine a number of options with regard to their number and features and how to single out their goodness value. In Section 4, I shall focus on good agents and on three distinct ways in which they may be good: tendential goodness, actual goodness, and purely actual goodness. Relatedly, among the actions connected with a certain GC‐power, I shall also distinguish between primary and secondary actions and between pure and impure actions. In Section 5, good actions will be examined. Actions may be good in three distinct ways. Indeed, actions may be endowed with primary goodness, secondary goodness and preventative goodness. In Section 6, I shall face the remaining problems.