Abstract
Abstract We add a historical and regional dimension to the debate on the Greek debt crisis by analysing repeated cycles of entry and exit from the gold standard, government default, and financial supervision for four South-East European countries from political independence to World War II. The prevailing pattern of fiscal dominance was broken only under financial supervision, when conditionality scaled back the treasury’s influence; only then were central banks able to stabilize their exchange rates. A political economy analysis for Greece finds that financial supervision was politically acceptable as it made successfully adhering to gold more likely in the view of contemporaries.
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