Abstract

For Glendoe hydro-electric scheme in Scotland, the tunnelling contract was design–build. After a year, the tunnel collapsed, blocking a 71-m length, which necessitated construction of a by-pass tunnel. The responsibility for the collapse was examined in court and the findings were later appealed by a further three judges. The judge of the first case found that the cause of the failure was “erodible rock” and the other three judges agreed, but, it is argued, that there is evidence for a complex wedge failure at a scale larger than the geological mapping. It is considered that the Owner of the tunnel, Scottish Southern Electricity took on the risk by agreeing to a TBM-constructed, mostly unlined tunnel rather than a drill and blasted, fully lined tunnel as had been postulated at tender. The Contractor, Hochtief, constructed the tunnel and lined it in accordance with a Rock Excavation Classification design sheet that was agreed by all parties and approved by the Engineer. A clause, ‘Option M’ limited the responsibility of the Contractor “for defects in the works due to his design so far as he proves that he used reasonable skill and care to ensure that it complied with the works information”. The question is posed as to whether or not the current judicial process may be an impediment to valid decision-making on responsibility for dealing with complex geotechnical problems. This paper suggests that these issues require a technical assessment and engineering judgement decision, rather than a legal opinion, adjudicated on the basis of opined contractual responsibility. Perhaps, an erudite technical panel deliberation rather than a judicial process should be given the final authority in such cases.

Highlights

  • There is always risk in carrying out engineering works below ground because of geological variability, the difficulties in producing a representative model and problems with deciding on parameters

  • Pöyry predicted that the lining requirement could be reduced to 40% for a tunnel boring machine (TBM)-constructed tunnel, compared to the 100% anticipated for a tunnel constructed by drill and blast (Carloway 2018, para 23)

  • There are no numerical modelling methods of which I am aware that can deal with such ductile, undulating this? He would conclude that the ground conditions above the tunnel were considerably worse than those inspected in the tunnel

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Summary

Introduction

There is always risk in carrying out engineering works below ground because of geological variability, the difficulties in producing a representative model and problems with deciding on parameters. That preliminary design of the works is let for tender, examined by various contractors during the tendering phase, one of whom will be later contracted to carry out further site investigation (possibly) and the final design of the works. He will construct the works, to be supervised and approved by a consulting engineer advising the Owner/Client. For the Glendoe hydro-electricity project, which will be discussed in detail later, the headrace tunnel was originally designed by the Owner’s engineer, Jacobs, to be constructed by drill and blast and to be fully lined (Carloway 2018, para 22).

Geotechnical Risk
Example Case 1—Ilkley Moor Quarry
The Glendoe Headrace Tunnel
Geological Conditions in the Headrace Tunnel
Geotechnical Conditions
The Operations
Precedent
The Extent of the Collapse
The Causes of the Collapse
The Q‐System
Inspections
3.11 Investigation
3.10 The Borehole
3.12 The Experts Views on Lining the Tunnel
3.13 The Opinion of Lord Woolman
3.14 The Appeal
Findings
Discussion
Conclusions
Full Text
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