Abstract

Abstract The paper examines the possible opening of an infringement procedure against Germany as a result of the breaches that emerge from the declaration by the German Constitutional Court that the Court of Justice has acted ultra vires in the Weiss judgment (C-493/17). The proportionality assessment of the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) of the European Central Bank (ECB), carried by the Court of Justice, is contested by the domestic court. We recall that the Commission enjoys great discretion regarding the launch of an infringement action based upon Article 258 of the TFEU and may be reluctant to use its powers, considering the special position of the constitutional courts in the context of Article 267 TFEU as well as the present situation of emergency following the pandemic. Yet, the possibility to start an infringement procedure for breaches of Treaty obligations resulting from an incorrect interpretation of domestic courts was admitted in case C-129/00 Commission v. Italy and applied in two subsequent cases (C-154/08 Commission v. Spain and C-416/17 Commission v. France). As a result of the ruling of May 5, 2020, the Court of Justice may find that Germany failed to fulfil obligations stemming from Article 267 TFEU and the related case-law, Article 19 TEU, as well as Article 5(2) TEU. Other breaches concern the independence of the ECB and of the Bundesbank (being it a Member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the Eurosystem) as defined in Articles 130, 282(3) TFEU and Article 7 of the Protocol (No. 4) on the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB. We argue in favour of the violation of all these provisions read in conjunction with the duty of loyal cooperation, laid down in Article 4(3) TEU. Yet, we conclude that it is uncertain whether the Commission will open (or continue) an infringement procedure against Germany since the Bundesbank may act to satisfy the requests of the German Constitutional Court in relation to the proportionality of the PSPP. It is to be hoped that the German State organs will make sure that the PSPP may be continued, thus ensuring the functioning of the Eurozone, despite the attack of the BVerfG to the EU Judicature and to Weiss ruling in particular.

Highlights

  • The paper examines the possible opening of an infringement procedure against Germany as a result of the breaches that emerge from the declaration by the German Constitutional Court that the Court of Justice has acted ultra vires in the Weiss judgment (C-493/17)

  • We conclude that it is uncertain whether the Commission will open an infringement procedure against Germany since the Bundesbank may act to satisfy the requests of the German Constitutional Court in relation to the proportionality of the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP)

  • Since the ruling of the BVerfG, declaring that the Weiss judgment[5] is ultra vires, does not have immediate effects, any infringement action against Germany would be devoid of any purpose[6] if at the expiry of the transitional period given by the BVerfG to the Bundesbank to coordinate with the European System of Central Banks, the German central bank was able to confirm that the PSPP complies with the proportionality principle.[7]

Read more

Summary

The Envisaged Breaches of Treaty Obligations Committed by the BVerfG

“The mere fact of consenting to the jurisdiction of the CJEU creates an expectation of obedience”[34] which can be explained by the need to ensure that EU law is applied and interpreted in a uniform manner throughout the EU As it was stated in opinion 2/2013: ”[ : : : ] The judicial system [ : : : ] has as its keystone the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU, which, by setting up a dialogue between one court and another, between the Court of Justice and the courts and tribunals of the Member States, has the object of securing uniform interpretation of EU law— thereby serving to ensure its consistency, its full effect and its autonomy as well as, the particular nature of the law established by the Treaties—.”35.

The Provisions Granting Independence to the ESCB and the ECB
The Duty of Loyal Cooperation and the Principle of Conferral
Final Remarks
Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.