The German Dilemma: Agenda for the Conference of the Foreign Ministers

Abstract

T WO MONTHS after the fall of Georgi Malenkov, the Soviet regime opened a global diplomatic offensive. Its main objectives were apparently: (1) to obtain a world-wide relaxation of tensions; (2) to create a neutralized buffer area in Europe, running from Germany through Austria to Yugoslavia; (3) to establish more friendly relations with those countries, notably India, which were committed to a policy of non-alignment in the cold war; and (4) to work toward the eventual neutralization of Japan. This Soviet diplomatic offensive coincided with Chou Enlai's conciliatory moves the Bandung Conference, especially his declaration of willingness to seek a peaceful settlement of disputes with the United States by direct negotiation. The Kremlin's opening move was the sudden reversal of its policy with respect to Austria. The Western powers, caught flat-footed, had no choice but to welcome the Austrian State Treaty, although they were uncomfortably aware that, by this action, the Russians had opened a new gambit in the struggle for the control of Germany. Next, the Soviet leaders made their pilgrimage to Belgrade, there to confess abjectly that their denunciation of Titoist deviation in 1948 had been a grave error and to seek a normalization of relations. On May 10, the Kremlin published its new disarmament proposal, for the first time agreeing to the Western demand that conventional forces be reduced to numerical ceilings, rather than by percentage cuts. These moves strengthened the growing European demand for a fourpower conference at the summit to the point where Washington could no longer resist, especially as the demand was strongly put forward by Sir Anthony Eden, then in the midst of an election campaign. The meeting was set for July 18, Geneva, Switzerland. Meanwhile, having agreed to a four-power conference, the Russians continued their offensive. Peace talks were opened with Japan. Prime Minister Nehru was welcomed in Moscow. And, finally, Chancellor Adenauer, long denounced by the Kremlin as a militarist and warmonger, was invited to pay a visit to the Soviet capital. In a letter to the New York Times, dated April 18, 1955, this observer analyzed the probable impact of the opening Soviet move in Austria as follows: