The Geneva effect: where officials sit influences where they stand on WTO priorities*

Abstract

Do representatives of member states in Geneva and officials based in capitals agree on priorities for cooperation in the World Trade Organization? Exploiting an original survey of trade policy officials, we find that respondents representing their countries in Geneva often accord substantially different priorities to institutional reform and policy issues than officials based in capitals. We hypothesize that this ‘Geneva effect’ reflects bureaucratic capacity in capitals and autonomy of Geneva-based officials, and that the effect should be smaller for officials from OECD member states, given extensive interaction outside the WTO to define good regulatory policies and address trade issues of common concern. Empirical analysis supports these hypotheses but also reveals differences in prioritization between Geneva and capital-based officials from OECD countries for specific issues. The results suggest that the prospects of international cooperation may be influenced not only by well-understood differences between states that reflect material interests and domestic political economy drivers, but by differences in relative priorities accorded to issues by officials representing states in international organizations and officials based in capitals.