Abstract

This study critically assesses the claim of the cartel party theory that the party in central office (PCO) has lost its powers to the party in public office (PPO) as parties have adapted to various changes in their operating ‘environment’. The study argues that a party’s tendency to adapt is conditioned by the party’s ‘genetic’ heritage: if the PCO assumed a prominent position during the party’s institutionalization, it can more likely stand against external pressures compared to a PCO that has been traditionally weak. The study compares the development (1983–2017) of two Finnish parties, which hail from polar ‘genetic’ traditions: a social democratic mass party and a conservative cadre party. The change of the party ‘environment’ has strongly supported PCO’s decay. Unlike earlier longitudinal studies on intra-party power balance, the study assesses all significant power dimensions and finds a contradictory development: while the distribution of leadership positions and resources increasingly favour the PPO in both parties, significant ‘genetic’ differences in the distribution of formal decision-making power have not diminished at all. If statutory regulations matter, the results suggest that the PPO cannot ‘insulate’ like the cartel model expects in parties where the PCO’s strong role has been strictly codified.

Highlights

  • This study critically assesses the claim of Katz and Mair’s (1995, 2002, 2009, 2018) cartel party theory that during the last quarter of the 20th century extra-parliamentary parties’

  • For Duverger, the most important factor that determines the development of the party in central office (PCO)/party in public office (PPO) power relationship in a party was the nature and locus of the elite that formed the party’s extra-parliamentary organization. When it was formed internally, by established parliamentary elites, the PCO assumed a role of a weak electoral campaign organization with no political significance, led by MPs and few upper class–based activists who worked for personal spoils

  • This is the ideal-typical formation of the cadre party model

Read more

Summary

Introduction

This study critically assesses the claim of Katz and Mair’s (1995, 2002, 2009, 2018) cartel party theory that during the last quarter of the 20th century extra-parliamentary parties’. When it was formed internally, by established parliamentary elites (i.e. the PPO), the PCO assumed a role of a weak electoral campaign organization with no political significance, led by MPs and few upper class–based activists who worked for personal spoils This is the ideal-typical formation of the cadre party model. This ‘environmental’ change presented a threat and a reason to reform especially to parties whose primary goal is vote maximization and where the PCO should be least able to defend its position For these reasons, these parties (H1) likely entered the cartel party era with a power balance that still favoured the PPO, (H2) adapted to the pressures swiftly, and (H3) continue to emphasize the status of the PPO. Finnish parties have faced several external pressures, which according to cartel party theory should weaken the PCO

Methods and data
Findings
Conclusion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call