The Genealogy of Differences in the Americas

Abstract

In our target article (Fuerst & Kirkegaard, 2016, this issue), we tested the racial-cognitive ability-socioeconomic (R~CA-S) hypothesis (as proposed by, for example: Lynn, 2008). An R~CA-S model attempts to account for the apparent covariance between biogeographic ancestry (BGA) (or race1), cognitive ability and socioeconomic outcomes. It proposes that most of the association between BGA and socioeconomic outcomes is mediated by cognitive ability and that the association between BGA and cognitive ability is, in turn, dependent on factors (for example: culture, genes and epigenes) which are transmitted along genealogical lines. We examined the relation between estimated racial admixture, cognitive ability and socioeconomic outcomes across the 35 sovereign nations of the Americas as well as first-level administrative divisions (states and departments) of 4 nations (USA, Mexico, Colombia and Brazil). Generally, we found strong ecological correlations (r's .5-.8) between admixture, cognitive ability and S. Cognitive ability was found to statistically mediate the R~S association. Here we reply to the six commentaries on our paper.1. Ibarra: Discrimination as an explanationIbarra (2016) criticizes our paper on the grounds that it represents statistical justification for thesis suspected of racism and a regression in everything [the] social sciences have overcome. As part of her critique, she questions:1. Our use of ancestry as predictor (Another objection about the study of Fuerst and Kirkegaard is the variable European ancestry.)2. Our use of measured cognitive ability as mediator, both because: a. this variable is not inclusive enough. (PISA assesses three core competencies [...] but not others difficult to quantify and which, according to experts, are essential to meet the challenges of the 21st century: the psychological, moral, civic and artistic development goals.)b. individual (and therefore group) differences in cognitive ability can not have genetic basis. study falls into the same error as sociobiology, assuming that the genetic makeup determines the cognitive level [...] one wonders after reading the study of Fuerst and Kirkegaard, what sense does it have pretending to demonstrate statistically that ones belonging to race, or genetic constitution, is related to cognitive abilities?)3. Our use of geographical-environmental factors as controls. (But what seems to me most objectionable about the study presented by Fuerst and Kirkegaard is their choice of independent variables [...] their attention focuses on two variables which they consider to have considerable influence on cognitive skills: the climate, and the struggle of the body against parasites [...] there is nothing within the study to justify their choice of these variables in explaining complex outcome.)4. Our use of S-factor scores as dependent rather than independent variable. (The development of cognitive competencies is closely linked to family and school training [...] The outcome of education is complex subject affected by many variables.)5. Our lack of historical contextualization, meaning our disinclination to interpret the results from the perspective of what van den Berghe (1987) and Fuerst (2015a) called the anti-racial worldview. (But in fact, skin color and purity of race are irrelevant in sociological analysis. What is truly relevant is their permanence at the top of the constitution of power and the mechanisms that have assured them such permanence.)From Ibarra's point of view, we are making grand petitio principii (This logic departs from what is before us, and it refers back to an origin where the final outcome is pre-formed and predestined...). She apparently takes it for granted that, on average, individuals within SIRE groups, SIRE groups within regions, administrative units within countries and countries in the New World which have more ancestry relative to African and Amerindian will, in her words, show better cognitive skills and significantly higher income than the rest. …