The Gender Gap in Political Clientelism: Problem-Solving Networks and the Division of Political Work in Argentina

Abstract

The literature on clientelism has recognized the importance of problem-solving networks, but ignored their gendered nature. Contrary to what is often assumed, I argue that female brokers have fewer opportunities to use clientelism for building, enlarging, and sustaining political networks than male brokers. First, I find that female brokers invest heavily in a nonvoting constituency because their work centers on children. The gendered division of political work hence reduces women’s chances of building a following. Second, female brokers are less able to distribute resources beyond their political network, diminishing their chances of enlarging the size of their constituency. Third, female brokers have a harder time punishing those who receive benefits but fail to participate in politics, limiting their ability to recruit new followers. Drawing on two decades of fieldwork in Argentina, this article studies the gender gap in political clientelism and the consequences of the division of political work for political representation. The article shows how these differences in opportunities, over time, translate into a political underrepresentation of female brokers and an impoverished quality of democracy.