Abstract
AbstractThis article studies a game between authors and editors. Editors play as leaders while authors are the followers. Authors maximize the number of publications seeking to increase the impact of their work in the literature, captured by citations. Editors maximize the quality of papers they publish in order to increase the reputation of their journals. The main results are: (i) rules aimed at increasing scholars productivity, such as requirements to obtain tenure, increase author's citations and journal's quality; (ii) editors willingness to build journal's reputation hurt journal's quality and increase author's publications; (iii) journal's reputation increases citations and journal's quality.
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