Abstract
AbstractThe article criticizes Gale and Pruss's new cosmological argument (hereafter GP) which purports to prove that the world is created/designed by a powerful intelligent necessarily existing supernatural being (not the full-fledged God of theism). First, the article employs a ‘necessitist’ counterexample to GP's modal premise, S5. Second, it is argued that GP presupposes a restricted range of possible accounts of the generation of the universe. Third, it is argued that GP's argument that the creator is a necessary being is flawed. Fourth, it is argued that GP's argument against Quinn's objection, modelled on the advaita Hindu view of creation by an impersonal being, also fails.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
