The Future of US-Taiwan Relations

Abstract

I n analyzing future of US-Taiwan relations, one must begin with legal and political framework surrounding normalization of relations with People's Republic of China effected by Carter Administration in late 1978 and early 1979.1 Despite President Reagan's personal feelings about Taiwan, his administration cannot disregard this framework without paying a significant political cost at home and abroad. There are, however, methods of maneuvering within framework of normalization that each administration can resort to in order to maximize or minimize its relations with Taiwan. For this reason, second part of this essay deals with Reagan's policy toward Taiwan. The last part will tackle some issues in implementing that policy, and their implications for US-Taiwan-PRC relations. When President Carter announced on December 15, 1978, that he had reached an agreement with PRC to normalize relations, he virtually accepted all three PRC conditions for normalization-the severance of diplomatic relations with ROC, abrogation of US-ROC mutual defense treaty, and withdrawal of troops from Taiwan-all without receiving in return any promise from PRC to refrain from using force against Taiwan. In fact, only concession he received from PRC was that latter abstained from insisting on a US commitment not to sell arms to Taiwan following normalization. After normalization process had been completed, however, PRC did register its opposition to further US arms sales to Taiwan. On issue of legal status of Taiwan, Carter only acknowledge(d), but did not recognize, the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.