Abstract

Despite the warming of US - Soviet relations, the US will still need to conduct extensive satellite reconnaissance, as will the Soviets. Besides monitoring advances in military technology and compliance with arms-control treaties, satellites have additional targets to examine. As demonstrated by recent events in the Persian Gulf, regional hot spots present constant threats. Targeting weaponry or listening in on an enemy's military communications from space is feasible form any nation operating a spy satellite. But, at the same time, satellites will also enable nations to gauge threats accurately and thus possibly circumvent potential hostilities. In any event, a multitude of orbiting eyes and ears from various countries - hostile, friendly and neutral - will affect international affairs for some time to come. Much of the surveillance technology other countries will use, however, will not match that of the US. Unclassified documents, military experts and former intelligence officials reveal that US satellite reconnaissance, having been an established and accepted component of intelligence operations for more than 30 years, has now reached a pinnacle of high technology. Indeed, analysts think the US may budget as much as $5 billion on space reconnaissance each year; the Department of Defense has already spentmore » an estimated $100 billion since 1960, when the US began launching its photoreconnaissance satellites.« less

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