The Future of Europe and NATO's Outdated Solutions

Abstract

I n modern history,Western Europe has been the fulcrum of world politics. Since World War II, however, the balance of power has shifted to the United States and the Soviet Union: nations which, prior to 1939, were considered on the periphery of global politics. Why has this come about? Is it a matter of political will, or does Western Europe lack the resources? Admittedly, this century's internecine European wars had, by 1945, caused the collapse of Germany and the exhaustion of France and Great Britain, until then the leading powers. But why has their decline been more than temporary? The Soviet Union, after all, suffered more heavily than Western Europe in both World Wars. The answer is complex but clearly more dependent on psychological than on resources factors. The major Western European nations (Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Belgium-Netherlands-Luxembourg) have a population only twenty percent smaller, and a gross national product (GNP) double that of the Soviet Union. If Austria and Switzerland are added, this group has combined a GNP only twenty percent smaller than that of the United States and a population roughly equal in size. Free Europe's total population is roughly equal to that of the Warsaw Pact nations and its GNP is twice as large. Yet, it would seem that the combined efforts of Western Europe and America are not adequate to contain Russian military power. Some argue that Western Europe lacks resources. But if resources are measured in terms of either potential or actual military expenditures and men under arms, the Western Alliance should be significantly more powerful than the Warsaw Pact. The causes of this conundrum may be found in prevailing attitudes towards defense among the Western European nations. The great nations of free Europe have allowed themselves to succumb to the nation mentality, which rationalizes lack of initiative and sees dependence on larger powers as the only feasible security policy. By contrast, the small neutral state of Sweden maintains a peacetime air force and a wartime field army as large as any in Western Europe. (Sweden also supports its own research and development, procurement, and training establishment, strongly suggesting that the panacea of multinational standardization is suspect.) The lack of centralized decisioii makiing within Europe and a constricted geographical space do inhibit European strategic power. But these factors do not explain Europe's weakness in conventional defense, a weakness which must be cor-