The Future of Arab Democracy under the Rentier System: The Case of Sudan

Abstract

The rentier economy has long been an important source of power for autocratic regimes, serving as a key tool for Arab authoritarianism. Rentierism is a grave matter as it not only hinders economic liberalisation, but it also disrupts the development of democracy. Following the political economy literature that demonstrates an inverse correlation between democracy and rentierism and shows the responsibility of political systems for the emergence of rentier practices, this paper examines how ruling elites in Arab states use rents to buttress their authoritarian regimes and obstruct the building of a democratic society. To better understand the factors that shape and sustain the rentier system, the paper focuses on the case of Sudan, where rentierism is deeply embedded. The paper sheds light on the challenges impeding the transfer of power from the military establishment to civilian elites, given the resilience of the rentier economy and the prevalence of negative practices that strengthen authoritarianism, such as the spread of clientelism and endemic levels of corruption. The paper concludes that it is impossible to build a democratic system in the shadow of the rentier structure. It also discusses ways to dismantle the rentier economy in Sudan to ensure the emergence of a productive state by moving beyond the rentier social contract to a new social pact.