Abstract

We show that five important elements of the ‘nomological package’—laws, counterfactuals, chances, dispositions, and counterfactuals—needn’t be a problem for the Growing-Block view. We begin with the framework given in Briggs and Forbes (in The real truth about the unreal future. Oxford studies in metaphysics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), and, taking laws as primitive, we show that the Growing-Block view has the resources to provide an account of possibility, and a natural semantics for non-backtracking causal counterfactuals. We show how objective chances might ground a more fine-grained concept of feasibility, and furnished a places in the structure where causation and dispositions might fit. The Growing-Block view, thus understood, provides the resources to explain the close link between modality and tense, so that it predicts modal change as time passes. This account lets us capture not only what the future might hold for us, and also what might have been.

Highlights

  • We show that five important elements of the ‘nomological package’— laws, counterfactuals, chances, dispositions, and counterfactuals—needn’t be a problem for the Growing-Block view

  • Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), and, taking laws as primitive, we show that the Growing-Block view has the resources to provide an account of possibility, and a natural semantics for non-backtracking causal counterfactuals

  • We have shown that five important elements of the nomological package—laws, counterfactuals, chances, dispositions, and counterfactuals—needn’t be a problem for the Growing-Block view

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Summary

The Growing-Block view

The Growing-Block view has two central commitments: first, that past and present events and things exist, while future events and things do not; and second, that the passage of time consists of new events and things coming into existence. It is essentially a dynamic view, on which the ontology of the world undergoes a fundamental change as time passes. We claim that on the Growing-Block view, what is possible undergoes a fundamental change as well. We will rely on the version of the view we developed in Briggs and Forbes (2012)

A summary of the Briggs–Forbes view
A non-Humean account of the nomological package
Objection: are we fundamentalists?
Feasibility
Counterfactuals
Indicatives
Objection: inflexibility
Objection
Chance
11 Sketch of a proof
Comparison with Storrs McCall’s view
Dispositions and causation
Dispositions
Causation
Odds and ends
Conclusion
Full Text
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