Abstract
What is the function of modal judgment? Why do we (need to be able to) make judgments of possibility and necessity? Or are such judgments, in fact, dispensable? This paper introduces and develops an answer to these questions based on Kant’s remarks in section 76 of the Critique of Judgment. Here, Kant appears to argue the following: that a capacity to make modal judgments using (categorial) modal concepts is required for a capacity for objective representation, in light of our split cognitive architecture. This split cognitive architecture leaves room for a mismatch between our concepts and intuitions and, Kant argues, that is why we need modal concepts and modal judgments. In this paper, I develop this account of the function of modal judgment and to explore the extent to which it may improve upon contemporary alternatives. I focus on one particularly important challenge for the account: to explain why a distinction between the actual and the possible, rather than merely a distinction between the actual and the non-actual, is required. In order to answer this question, I supplement the account with a particular way of thinking about objectivity.
Highlights
What is the function of modal judgment? Why do we make judgments of possibility and necessity? Or are such judgments, dispensable? My aim in this paper is to introduce and develop a new answer to these questions
Kant appears to argue the following: that a capacity to make modal judgments using modal concepts is required for our capacity for objective representation, in light of our split cognitive architecture
This split cognitive architecture leaves room for a mismatch between our concepts and intuitions which could undermine the possibility of objective representation and, Kant argues, that is why we need modal concepts and modal judgments
Summary
What is the function of modal judgment? Why do we (need to be able to) make judgments of possibility and necessity? Or are such judgments, dispensable? My aim in this paper is to introduce and develop a new answer to these questions. Creatures with minds like ours require both intuitions (direct, singular representations) and concepts (mediate, general representations), both the contributions of sensibility (the capacity to be presented with objects in experience) and of thought to have objective representations about the world This split cognitive architecture leaves room for a mismatch between our concepts and intuitions which could undermine the possibility of objective representation and, Kant argues, that is why we need modal concepts and modal judgments. I won’t discuss these in extensive detail, or argue that they fail, but I will suggest where a Kantian account might have the potential to improve upon them, or at least provide an interesting alternative. In brief: the account has the potential to answer the transcendental question because the function of judgments about possibility and actuality is to make possible objective thought. In order to answer this question, I will need to supplement the account with a particular way of thinking about objectivity
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