The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster and the Democratic Party of Japan

Abstract

The Fukushima nuclear disaster was a critical juncture in the world's relationship with nuclear energy, as well as Japan's postwar political economy, society, and national psyche. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), and particularly Prime Minister Kan, were later widely criticized for mismanaging the disaster, contributing to the party's loss of power. This article closely examines the crisis as it unfolded, assessing the degree to which the government's chaotic response can be attributed to the DPJ's political leadership. It finds that the DPJ inherited a difficult hand when coming to power in 2009, with deep structural problems developed under the long Liberal Democratic Party rule. Existing procedures and organizations were drastically inadequate, information and communications problems plagued decision making and coordination. Kan's leadership was, on balance, beneficial, taking control where the locus of responsibility and decision-making was ambiguous and solving several information and communication problems. This article is one of the first readily accessible English-language analyses examining this critical juncture, and it includes a broadly readable account of primary government decision makers as the disaster unfolded.