The “French factor” and the dynamics of the Chanak crisis (September–October 1922)

Abstract

The centenary of the Chanak crisis, which played significant role in the development of the Kemalist revolution and in the international transformations in the Asia Minor and the Near East, stimulates to analyse its underresearched aspects. The article aims to demonstrate the role of the “French factor” during the crisis. This “factor” is conceived as the actions of the French diplomacy, but also as their perception by the other international actors in September–October 1922. The author bases his conclusions on the evidence taken from the published French diplomatic documents and the archival materials of the French Ministry’s of the armed forces historical services. The documents taken from the National archives of the Great Britain were used in order to analyse the Anglo-French relations. The author concludes that the impact of the “French factor” during the crisis was ambivalent. At the one hand, R. Poincaré, French Prime Minister and Minister for foreign affairs, who aimed to exclude the growth of the Chanak crisis into the war and to make Paris the mediator between the British and the Kemalists, achieved some results and contributed to Ankara’s consent to the armistice negotiations. At the other hand, the desire of Poincaré to “sit on two chairs” and to develop the friendly relations with both Ankara and London was difficult to realise. By taking clearer though confrontational position, M. Kemal and British Secretary of State for foreign affairs G. Curzon gained more than Poincaré who hoped to effectuate more subtle diplomatic maneuvering.