Abstract

French army logistics of the Crimean War are generally considered to have been better organized than their British counterpart. This sometimes erroneous belief was fuelled by letters home (from officers and men) as well as by the reporting of various ‘special correspondents’ in the Crimea, and created an emotional response favourable to the ordinary soldier and, in particular, towards the French. This then became the basis for arguments for reform of the British army in the military and domestic press and in Parliament. Clamour for reform on French lines led to official studies being made of the French army, especially of logistics, officer education, and even uniforms. The French army, however, was little understood and the resulting ephemeral corps-style units (such as Land Transport Corps, Army Work Corps, and Mounted Staff Corps) were quickly found faulty. In fact, official study of the French army often had little or no effect on the major reforms of the war. Emulation of the French was ultimately short-lived and of little effect; the favourable perception of the French was based on short-term emotional response and, indeed, the desire for army reform had its sting drawn with the establishment of the Roebuck Committee. Post-war retrenchment and success in the Indian Mutiny would stifle what was left of the reform debate.

Highlights

  • Traditional English-language historiography of the Crimean War suggests that the French army, in its logistics, was superior to that of the British army, especially during the winter of 1854 and 1855

  • This article will analyse the perception of French army logistics during the Crimean War and the effect they had on British army reforms during the same period

  • In conclusion, admiration for and, more importantly, emulation of the French army support services during and after the Crimean War were shortlived, and based upon a skewed perception of its relative effectiveness compared with the British army

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Summary

Anthony Dawson

Traditional English-language historiography of the Crimean War suggests that the French army, in its logistics, was superior to that of the British army, especially during the winter of 1854 and 1855. Study of French military administration by Captain Thomas Thackeray, was published too late (1856), and considered too impenetrable and Francophile to have much immediate impact on the post-Crimean reform debate.[16] The French practice of appointing commissariat officers from serving army officers, was adopted in Britain in 1858, but whereas in France captains who had served in the line and showed aptitude as an intendant were appointed, British commissariat officers were chosen from among younger, less experienced subalterns The overall impression created from official reports into the commissariat and transport arrangements, combined with a rose-tinted perception of the French system, was one of French success and professionalism compared to the incompetence of the British system, a belief that would endure until the collapse of the French military machine in 1870 and 1871

The French viewpoint
Enter Colonel McMurdo and the LTC
The French experience
The significance of the French army in British army reform
Conclusion

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