Abstract
[full article, abstract in English; only abstract in Lithuanian]
 
 This paper proposes a new pragmatic interpretation of the Frege–Geach problem and presents a possible solution using a model of ascriptive legal language. The first section includes the definition of the Frege–Geach problem. In the second section, I analyze the content of Geach’s critical argument against prescriptivism in ethics. I discuss what Geach means by ascriptivism, why he mixes it with prescriptivism, and why a particular article by Herbert Hart became the subject of criticism by Geach. The third section proposes a possible solution to the Frege–Geach problem based on the explication of the assertoric force of ascriptive legal utterances and the performativity of legal language.
Highlights
Formulating the Frege–Geach ProblemIn his article “Assertion”, Geach puts forth a thesis that questions any noncognitivist theory: “A thought may have just the same content whether you assent to its truth or not; a proposition may occur in discourse asserted, unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same proposition” (Geach 1965: 449)
The Frege–Geach Problem, formulated by Peter Geach as a critical argument against the prescriptive theory of Richard Hare, proved to be so enduring that the subsequent development of noncognitivism in ethics was concerned with comprehending the problem, describing it, and seeking a solution to it
It is true that the explication of the Frege–Geach problem has been widely discussed in ethical theories; the application of this problem in other discourses has received insufficient attention
Summary
In his article “Assertion”, Geach puts forth a thesis that questions any noncognitivist theory: “A thought may have just the same content whether you assent to its truth or not; a proposition may occur in discourse asserted, unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same proposition” (Geach 1965: 449). It is possible to grasp and express a thought without recognizing it as true, that is, without rendering judgment He states that in an assertive sentence there is no special component corresponding to assertion; the fact that something is being stated is part of the form of that sentence. The Frege point is based on the following theses: 1) only those sentences that are expressed with assertive force (i.e., the thoughts that correspond to them) must be recognized as true and can be elements of the conclusion; 2) in an assertive sentence, there is no special component corresponding to assertion, and the fact that something is being stated is included in the form of the sentence; 3) a special symbol is needed so that we can assert something to be true,. ⊢ is the symbol of the name of the truth-value; and 4) the recognition of truth is expressed in the form of the assertive sentence
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