The Fragmentation of Value

Abstract

I want to discuss some problems created by a disparity between the fragmentation of value and the singleness of decision. These problems emerge in the form of practical conflicts, and they usually have moral components. By a practical conflict I do not mean merely a difficult decision. Decisions may be difficult for a number of reasons: because the considerations on different sides are very evenly balanced; because the facts are uncertain; because the probability of different outcomes of the possible courses of action is unknown. A difficult choice between chemotherapy and surgery, when it is uncertain which will be more effective, is not an example of what I mean by practical conflict, because it does not involve conflict between values which are incomparable for reasons apart from uncertainty about the facts. There can be cases where, even if one is fairly sure about the outcomes of alternative courses of action, or about their probability distributions, and even though one knows how to distinguish the pros and cons, one is nevertheless unable to bring them together in a single evaluative judgment, even to the extent of finding them evenly balanced. An even balance requires comparable quantities.